DOI: https://doi.org/10.18371/fcaptp.v2i23.122718

AGENCY COSTS AS FINANCIAL GROUNDS OF CORPORATE CONFLICTS

T. S. Smovzhenko, O. B. Denys

Abstract


In the article the economic essence of the category "corporate conflict" and "agency costs" was investigated. It is summarized that from the position of agency theory, corporate conflict can be interpreted as a result of violation of contract terms by one of the parties – an agent or a principal. It is shown that agency costs arise from separation of ownership of capital and capital management. The distinctive features of the category "agent costs " were highlighted. The influence of growth of residual agency costs on the emergence of corporate conflicts was substantiated. The differences of distribution of residual costs in concentrated and dispersed property were highlighted. It is shown that the estimation of residual costs is possible by indirect methods to finding dependencies between characteristics of financial relations and profitability. The approaches to estimating residual agency costs were given.


Keywords


corporate conflict; agency relations; agency costs; residual costs.

References


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GOST Style Citations


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ISSN (print) 2306-4994, ISSN (on-line) 2310-8770